12. Gas Preparedness

Here I share what gas preparedness really is. The chapter does not contain any security-sensitive information.[1]

Working with gas preparedness in particular was a conscious choice on my part, because within gaseous fuels in particular, there are so many synergies between preparedness and the climate transition.

I was hired to work on both of these goals in parallel, which is what I have done. And the fact is that if you understand GAS, and have a bit of a holistic view, you can solve both the Swedish preparedness and the sustainability issue at the same time. 

Sweden’s gas sector is special because we do not have our own extraction of fossil gas. The gas we need doesn’t need to be imported in sensitive systems as it is today. The gas can just as well be energy gas produced in Sweden and delivered from robust systems over which we have control. With a few new policy instruments in place, it would be possible to quickly increase the Swedish production of gas. Everything is in place and Swedish producers are ready. What is missing are long-term policy instruments.

Denmark exports gas to Sweden on the condition that they have gas to export. If Denmark has problems with its own gas sector, they can stop selling it to us. Even our protected customers are not protected in any real sense in the EU regulation regarding the security of gas supply [2], but are dependent on the interpretation of the writings and Denmark’s goodwill. And the gas needs for our socially important activities, such as the drinking water supply, are not secured either.[3] 

The fastest and only long-term safe way to really strengthen Sweden’s gas readiness is for us to complete the work of building up our own production of energy gas. According to the studies done in the area, we could relatively quickly increase Swedish production, if you show political predictability. And the area is well studied. This claim is well founded. [4] 

There is a potential of almost 10 TWh in 2030 [5] [6], in the region around the West-swedish gas grid, but then it is necessary that the right policy instruments are quickly put in place. (Sweden annually imports approx. 4-5 TWh of fossil natural gas [7] through the West Sweden gas network, part of which goes to socially critical operations.) 

A large-scale long-term and robust production of our own energy gas would strengthen Sweden’s competitiveness, increase our energy security, give us control over the gas flows that Sweden is so dependent on, increase the security of gas supply and improve the security of supply for the Swedish companies that are dependent on methane for their operations. [8] It would also improve the security of our Swedish gas system through the reduced risks of possible attacks from an external power that result from diversified and geographically dispersed production and introduction into the gas system. 

Did I mention flexibility and the possibility of predictable electricity production in the event of a crisis? The storage capacity? Gas can be a great commodity; on just the gas extracted from a small bag of food waste you can drive a bus 2.5 km![9] 

Then there is the important connection to the hydrogen that is now produced and that we have the potential to produce along the West-swedish gas network (with steam reformation), which needs to be converted from fossil to renewable in order to become attractive, which is another incentive to deliver biogas into the West-swedish gas network.[10] Unlike many countries in Europe with developed networks, in Sweden we lack a lot of gas culture and some knowledge about gas. We need to listen to other countries that have succeeded. 

In order for Sweden’s biogas investment to succeed, it is completely dependent on the existing Swedish gas infrastructure and the gas expertise that exists in Sweden today. That I would somehow do something that would risk this opportunity for Sweden is completely absurd to me! 

It is not even a large investment that would be needed for this to become a reality. The Swedish producers are waiting to get started, especially in southern Sweden. The only thing they would need to start is long-term political clarity. They need to have similar conditions as producers in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands. They don’t even have to have better conditions, but equivalent. [11] If Sweden were to get the right policy instruments, the transformation of Sweden’s gas sector could proceed quickly. 

It is true that such a development would also have very positive effects for Sweden’s climate work, as biogas through digestion is carbon dioxide negative (the only fuel with that characteristic), which means that it is better (climate-wise) the more you produce (up to a certain limit).[12] 

In addition to the reasons I have mentioned above, Sweden (with our use of the fossil gas) will have to pay very large climate fines to the EU if we continue as we have done, connected to the fact that we completely miss our climate goals, both in the short and long term .[13] 

What is also extremely important when we talk about preparedness is the clear connection of biogas to our food security. Today, Sweden is still heavily dependent on fertilizers from Russia and other countries with questionable stability. After the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions, this dependence has become increasingly problematic, which, together with logistical obstacles, has made access difficult.

This has affected the price and thus both agriculture globally and here in Sweden. It is in line with Sweden’s other policies in the area to try to reduce dependence on Russian supplies and review domestic production of fertilizers.[14]

Fertilizer production comes naturally with biogas production, as fertilizer is a by-product. There are also many other possible useful by-products such as protein feed, bioplastic etc. which are also imported to a large extent and where an increased degree of self-sufficiency contributes positively to Sweden’s crisis preparedness. With the option of importing fossil gas, no useful by-products are included.

New LNG terminal?

An LNG terminal that is being discussed to be able to import additional methane is perhaps (I was interrupted before I could complete my analysis) a necessity to complement a Swedish investment in large-scale Swedish energy gas production. But my assessment so far is that this is not the case, at least not for the socially critical activities. If Sweden chooses to go ahead with the idea of ​​investing in an LNG terminal, it needs to be preceded by a proper analysis of what consequences such a solution would have for the Swedish energy gas producers. It would be counter productive if we invested in a gas solution that destroyed for the Swedish gas industry.

The proposal for a new LNG terminal is something we have discussed several times with Nordion [15], who have investigated the issue. Some comments that came up in the discussions are, for example, that it is an extremely expensive solution, which Nordion is naturally not interested in taking, but if it were to be done, it would be on the condition that the state steps in and finances it.

Should Sweden decide on this solution (Floating Storage Regasification Unit), the time to receive such a ferry (according to Nordion) is several years, so it is not a quick fix to secure our gas supply.

In addition, market forces would make these new supplies of gas more expensive than today’s pipelines, making it difficult to make the LNG ferry economically viable. Buyers would still prefer to buy the gas from the pipeline (unless Sweden’s need for imported gas would increase very strongly). Should Sweden’s imports of gas increase sharply, it would directly negatively affect our Swedish gas producers. To me it seems like an unnecessary and large expense to invest in something that would possibly only be used if we had problems with the Danish deliveries, when we have better alternatives here at home. It is more cost-effective, and it would strengthen Swedish preparedness to invest instead in increasing security of supply for the systems we have today, in order to quickly get the Swedish supplies up. A new gas terminal in the port of Gothenburg, for example, could also become yet another easy target for attack by foreign powers that want to sabotage Swedish energy supply. And we don’t want gas explosions in the port of Gothenburg!

Swedish gas production is not at risk of attacks in the same way, because it is geographically diversified.

If one chooses the option of investing in a new LNG terminal, it is important that it becomes a complement to the Swedish gas production, and not the other way around, that the Swedish gas production becomes a complement to further gas imports, because then we would not create a safer Swedish gas system.

And if an LNG terminal were to be assessed as a cost-effective solution to solve the Swedish gas emergency, I suggest (to reduce the climate fines from the EU) that, just in case, examine the possibilities for guaranteed imports of pure LBG (and not sign contracts with a fossil gas supplier). An LNG terminal could provide the opportunity for more efficient gas trading, for example by transporting LBG from other parts of Sweden or Finland, for example, but that requires that we only use it for LBG.

I would like to link here to the article below, which is another example of Boethius’ advocacy work. When this article came out, I suggested that we from the agency respond to it because, in my opinion, it gives a false picture, but that suggestion was not accepted by my head of unit. So nice to have your own blog, where you can write what you want! Now I can tell you that this is not true. A new gas terminal is not the only solution.

‘Swedish drinking water threatened – new gas terminal the only solution 

Gustav Boethius, former manager for gas issues at the Energy Agency who has since become a whistleblower and authored the book ‘Ledningen’, thinks it was very unfortunate that Swedegas’ plans to connect the LNG port to the main grid were rejected in 2019.’ (Tidningen Näringslivet)